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Innovation, mark-ups and the degree of trade openness vary substantially across sectors.
This paper builds a multi-sector endogenous growth model to study the in￿ uence that asym-
metric trade liberalization and sectorial di⁄erences in the degree of product market competition
has on the e⁄ect of trade openness on R&D investments at a ￿rm level. I ￿nd that di⁄erences
in the degree of competition generate large di⁄erences on ￿rm innovative response to trade
liberalization. A movement from autarky to free trade promotes innovation and productivity
growth in those sectors which are initially less competitive. However, when the initial tari⁄level
is common across sectors, a homogeneous tari⁄ reduction promotes innovation in those sectors
which are initially more competitive. The paper suggests that trade liberalization could be a
source of industry productivity divergence: ￿rms that are located in industries with greater ex-
posure to foreign trade, invest a greater amount in R&D contributing to industry productivity
growth. Finally the paper ￿nds that these asymmetries generate important reallocative e⁄ects
that contribute to enlarge these di⁄erences.
Keywords: Sectorial productivity, international trade, innovation.
JEL CODES: F12, O43.
1 Introduction
A recent body of literature on both theoretical and empirical grounds has studied the in￿ uence
of trade openness and trade liberalization policies on productivity growth. These papers explore
the extent to which a larger degree of trade openness a⁄ects the rate of an industry￿ s technological
change and ultimately the evolution of TFP. To address this question, some researches have relied on
endogenous growth models with imperfect competition and product or proccess innovation (Rivera-
Batiz and Romer (1991a)), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991b)), Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos
(1990). Peretto (2005), Navas and Licandro(2011)), and other recent contributions have used ￿rm
heterogeneity and industrial dynamics (Atkenson and Burstein (2010), Navas and Sala (2010), Long,
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1Ra⁄ and Stahler (2011), Vannorenberghe (2008), Ederignton and Mc Calman (2007), Impulliti and
Licandro (2011), Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2008), Baldwin and Nicoud (2008)).
A common feature that is shared by all of these models is that a ￿rm￿ s investment in innovation
depends on the competition it faces in the market among other forces. Therefore, trade in￿ uences
innovation and productivity growth through an increase in competition. The e⁄ect of this channel
on innovation depends on several assumptions regarding the nature of innovation and the market
structure. Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991b) ￿nd that an increase in competition has a negative
e⁄ect on innovation because of the assumption of monopolistic competition and product innovation.
(Peretto (2005), Navas and Licandro (2011)) ￿nd that trade promotes technological change by
increasing competition in local markets under the assumptions of oligopolistic competition and
proccess innovation rather than monopolistic competition and product innovation. The more recent
generation of models shows that in either a static framework (Navas and Sala (2010), Long, Ra⁄
and Stahler (2011) etc.. ) or a dynamic context (Atkenson and Burstein (2010), Impulliti and
Licandro (2010)) the introduction of ￿rm heterogeneity adds a new dimension to think about
how trade a⁄ects innovation through competition. Trade openness promotes technological change
through the selection e⁄ect: Intensifying competition from abroad forces less e¢ cient ￿rms out
of an industry, and liberates productive resources that can be used by the most e¢ cient ￿rms to
produce and innovate.
These papers focus on the representative sector case, hence di⁄erences among sectors and the
interactions that could emerge because of these di⁄erences are not explored. Empirical evidence
suggests that industries are certainly not homogenous in two dimensions that are relevant to the
innovation investment decisions of ￿rms: product market competition and trade openness. Several
papers document substantial variation in mark-ups across sectors, which is typically considered as
a proxy for the degree of competition (Gri¢ th, Harrison and Simpson (2010), Eslava, Haltiwanger
and Kugler (2009)). For example, Epifani and Gancia (2011), report that in the US manufacturing
sector at a four-digit level of disaggregation, mark-ups vary from 1% (in the ￿rst quintile of the
distribution) to 60%. These authors observe that mark-ups vary also across countries (mark-ups
are larger in poor countries) and over time. The degree of trade openness varies substantially
across industries and recent evidence indicates that tari⁄ reductions following a deep process of
trade liberalization are asymmetric across sectors. Bustos (2010) documents the proccesses of trade
liberalization in Brazil and Argentina during the 90s. Despite the substantial variation in initial
tari⁄ levels across sectors, bilateral tari⁄s between the two countries were eliminated after their
admission to MERCOSUR at the beginning of the 1990s. Eslava, Haltiwanger and Kugler (2009)
review the proccess of trade liberalization in Colombia during the late 1980s. The trade reforms
that were undertaken in this contry during the second half of that decade, reduced both the average
tari⁄rate and the dispersion of tari⁄s across sectors, suggesting that the process was not symmetric
across industries. Similar proccesses have been documented in detail for other countries including
the Chinese import experience of the European Union (Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2010)), or
the Chilean experience (Pavnick (2002)).
This paper builds a multi-sector endogenous growth model with oligopolistic competition and
private R&D investments to study the e⁄ects of trade openness and trade liberalization policies on
innovation and productivity growth at the industry level. The aim of this paper is to introduce
asymmetries across sectors in the degrees of product market competition and the degree of trade
2openness to address several important questions. This paper explores, the consequences of the im-
plementation of a particular homogeneous trade policy in an environment in which industries di⁄er
in the degree of product market competition. This exercise enable us to isolate the contribution of
sectorial di⁄erences in product market competition to the relationship between trade and innova-
tion. In this exercise, we consider alternative trade liberalization policies, (i.e. a movement from
autarky to free trade, a tari⁄ reduction or an increase in the number of trade partners). Similarly,
in a second exercise, we investigate whether asymmetries in the proccess of trade liberalization
across sectors generate steady state di⁄erences in industry productivity growth in otherwise identi-
cal industries. In this case, we isolate the contribution of asymmetric exposure to foreign trade in
the evolution of an industry￿ s TFP.
The model is based on the work of Navas and Licandro (2011), who explore the e⁄ect of trade
liberalization on innovation and growth through its e⁄ect on competition in an oligopolistic general
equilibrium model (OLGE). The model emphasises the role of increased competition that results
from improved access to foreign markets on ￿rm decisions to innovate. There exists a continuum of
industries, each of which produces a di⁄erentiated product: within each industry, n ￿rms compete
Æ la Cournot and undertake proccess innovation to improve the state of technology in the spirit of
Neary (2005). The model predicts a positive relationship among innovation e⁄orts, ￿rm size and
productivity growth. The model focuses on trade openness and trade liberalization policies across
identical economies to better isolate the role played by competition. The paper shows that the total
output that is produced by a ￿rm increases with the degree of trade openness because ￿rms face a
more elastic residual demand. Given the complementarity between ￿rm size and innovation e⁄orts
the former increases innovation and productivity growth.
This paper introduces exogenous di⁄erences in the degree of product market competition across
industries: these di⁄erences could arise because the number of active ￿rms di⁄er across industries
or because the elasticities of substitution across varieties di⁄er. A movement from autarky to free
trade in all sectors increases ￿rm size, ￿m innovation e⁄orts and productivity growth in industries
which are initially less competitive. These increases occur because the increase in the perceived
elasticity of substitution (our measure for product market competition) is non-linear, and is thus
more important when the number of ￿rms is initially low. In other words, in sectors in which entry is
restricted, trade openness intensi￿es competition disproportionately: because ￿rms in such sectors
encounter a more elastic demand they decide to increase production and innovation. However,
when we consider the e⁄ect of a reduction in tari⁄s in sectors with initially identical tari⁄levels but
di⁄erent degrees of competition, we ￿nd that the largest gains from trade are obtained in sectors
which are initially more competitive. This result occurs because sectors with a uniform tari⁄ level
and a larger number of ￿rms, will be closer to an autarkic situation (prohibitive trade costs),
and will thus be less open to foreign markets. A homogeneous tari⁄ reduction causes a greate
increase in competition in sectors that are relatively closer to autarky (prohibitive trade costs).
Consequently, a tari⁄ reduction leads to a greater enhancement in innovation and productivity
growth in initially more competitive industries. Similar results are obtained for di⁄erences in the
elasticity of substitution.1
Additionally, we ￿nd that asymmetries in the trade liberalization proccess generate asymmetries
1A movement from autarky to free trade has a larger e⁄ect on innovation and productivity growth, when the
elasticity of substitution across products is lower, whereas in the context of tari⁄ reductions, a larger e⁄ect is expected
in industries that o⁄er very similar products.
3in innovation, ￿rm size and productivity growth in otherwise identical industries. More precisely,
industries that are open to foreign trade su⁄er from greater competition. This is associated with a
larger perceived elasticity of demand what induces ￿rms to increase the quantity that they produce.
Consequently, ￿rms increase their innovation e⁄ort more, having a positive impact on productivity
growth. These results are robust to other means of trade liberalization such as an asymmetric tari⁄
cut, or an increase in the number of trade partners.
This paper adopts a general equilibrium perspective when considering the impact of trade open-
ness and trade liberalization. By adopting this perspective, we found that sectors that are not
exposed to foreign trade or have smaller tari⁄reductions than other sectors, su⁄er from a reduction
in innovation e⁄orts, ￿rm size and productivity growth. This result is obtained because the sectors
that are more exposed to foreign competition have a larger reduction of mark-ups that causes de-
mand to shift to these products and thus causes a greater increase in production and innovation in
these industries. The increase in labour demand from these industries causes increases in real wages
and reduces the pro￿tability of ￿rms that are located in autarkic or less open sectors. Consequently,
as pro￿tability declines, innovation e⁄orts and productivity growth decreases. This general equilib-
rium e⁄ect is relevant and its importance decreases smoothly according to the number of industries
that we consider.
Although, this paper is related to a voluminous literature that examines the e⁄ects of trade
openness and trade liberalization on innovation and growth, to the best of my knowledge, this
paper is the ￿rst research to study the role of asymmetric trade liberalization in a context in which
sectorial di⁄erences in market power arise. Two relatively close papers in the area are Impulliti
and Licandro (2010) and Ederignton and Mc Calman (2007). The ￿rst paper introduces ￿rm
heterogeneity into the oligopolistic competition model ofNavas and Licandro(2011) to disentangle
the e⁄ects of trade openness on industry productivity growth that are derived from selection from
the e⁄ecs that are derived from a pure increase in competition. As each variety is produced by
an oligopoly in which all ￿rms have the same level of productivity, the results of this paper could
be also interpreted in terms of industry heterogeneity in which ￿xed operational costs determines
the mass of industries that are active at a particular point in time. By intensifying competition,
trade openness reduces pro￿tability and thus causes less e¢ cient industries to leave the market.
Although this model shares the framework with the current paper, the source of heterogeneity
across industries is initial productivity and other variables such as market power or trade openness
are identical across industries.
Ederignton and Mc Calman (2007) explore the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on the rate of
technology adoption in a small open economy. This paper ￿nds that unilateral trade liberalization
is likely to delay the adoption date for the median ￿rm. This e⁄ect depends on several industrial
characteristics and the e⁄ect is stronger in, for example, more competitive industries (low entry
costs, large domestic markets). Our paper di⁄ers in several dimensions. First, they use partial
equilibrium whereas we use general equilibrium: hence, they fail to address the interactions across
sectors that emerge in a general equilibrium framework. Second, by using monopolistic competition
they ignore the strategic interaction among ￿rms that becomes a crucial element in our model.
Finally, these authors focus on unilateral trade liberalization policies in a small open economy. In
contrast, we explore the e⁄ects of bilateral trade policies in an international oligopolistic context.
In addition, few theoretical papers have explored di⁄erences in the degree of product market
4competition and trade asymmetries when analyzing the impact of trade on aggregate outcomes. One
exception is the detailed study of Epifani and Gancia (2011) who outline the importance of existing
mark-up di⁄erences across sectors, across countries and over time, which causes a misallocation
of production factors. As all goods are assumed to enter the utility function symmetrically, the
Pareto-e¢ cient solution assigns the production factors equally across sectors. Asymmetric trade
liberalization creates welfare losses because it generates or ampli￿es the dispersion of sectorial mark-
ups and thus contributes to larger misallocations across sectors. Their paper studies the importance
of resource misallocation induced by trade in a static framework and its implications for welfare.
The current study complements this research, as it outlines the importance of these asymmetries
in a dynamic context by studying its consequences for innovation and growth.
The paper considers exogenous di⁄erences in competition across sectors. The model is suitable
for analysing the consequences of trade liberalization on productivity growth over a medium-term
horizon , or for situations in which entry is purely restrictive for institutional reasons. My research
agenda includes endogenising these di⁄erences in competition and will be developed in the near
future.
2 The model
Consider an economy that is populated by a continuum of consumers of measure L; with instanta-
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t denote respectively the consumption baskets of good X and good Y. Good Y is










Here a Cobb-Douglas subutility function between the di⁄erent varieties has been assumed with
the parameter ￿j controlling for the weights of each of these goods in a consumer￿ s budget. Each















; 0 ￿ ￿j < 1
2The existence of a traditional good allows for the reallocation of labor to the R&D sector without necessarily
reducing the labor that is assigned to the composite good sector. A similar result would hold under the assumption of
elastic labor supply as in the work of Aghion et al. (2001). Although the relationship between trade and employment
is interesting is not an issue in this paper.
5,where the parameter ￿j controls for the elasticity of substitution across varieties. The struc-
ture of our economy distinguishes between industries and subindustries where we have assumed a
unitary elasticity of substitution across industries. As we allow permanent industrial di⁄erences
in productivity growth to a⁄ect aggregate TFP growth rate, this preference structure is the only
compatible with a Balanced Growth Path in which labor allocation across sectors is constant (Ngai
and Pissarides (2006)).3
Each variety is produced under Cournot competition4 with a number of ￿rms nj which is
exogenously given. Each ￿rm produces according to the following technology:
qlijt = zlijtlx
lijt; (1)
where qlijt denotes the quantity produced by ￿rm l producing subvariety i in industry j at
time t; and zlijt denotes the ￿rms￿stock of knowledge: Firms can also undertake cost-reducing
innovations using the following technology:





zlijt; ￿ 2 (0;1); (2)
, which depends on the ￿rm￿ s stock of knowledge (zlijt), and the resources that are devoted
to innovation. In this set-up the stock of knowledge is ￿rm-speci￿c and there are no technological
spillovers among ￿rms. This assumption is made, to perfectly isolate the contribution of the increase
in competition that is derived from trade openness on innovation and productivity from other
sources (international R&D spillovers). Tjt is a technological constant, that includes industry
R&D productivity di⁄erences that are not attributable to the internal ￿rm proccess of knowledge
accumulation.
At any point in time ￿rms in j decide the quantity to supply and the optimal allocation of
workers for both, physical production and R&D, taking into consideration other ￿rms￿strategies.
This game belongs to the family of di⁄erential games, or repeated games de￿ned in continous
time, in which past actions a⁄ect current payo⁄s. Two di⁄erent concepts of Markov perfect Nash
equilibria have been proposed in the literature, the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibrium.
In an open-loop Nash equilibrium a ￿rm initially selects the optimal path of strategies taking other
￿rms￿path of strategies as given and the ￿rm remains to this path forever. In this sense an open-
loop Nash equilibrium is equivalent to a static Nash equilibrium in which the possible strategies
are time paths of actions and the associated payo⁄s are in￿nite sums of payo⁄s. This paper focuses
in open-loop Nash equilibria (OLNE), mainly because standard optimal control theory techniques
3This assumption simpli￿es calculations at some expenses. We have explored the role of the elasticity of substi-
tution across industries and considered a version of this model with an innovation function that presents decreasing
returns to scale in the accumulation of knowledge as in the work of Jones (1995). The advantage of this framework is
that the steady state productivity growth rate is identical across industries and therefore, the aggregate TFP growth
rate is constant independently of the elasticity of substitution across products. In this situation trade may generate
temporary di⁄erences in productivity growth across sectors but does not generate permanent di⁄erences. However,
the model is able to generate permanent di⁄erences in productivity levels across industries. The qualitative results
are identical to those presented further in the paper. Thus, the results that are presented here are robust to changes
in the elasticity of substitution across the di⁄erent varieties of the composite good Xt: (Available upon request).
4Under Cournot competition with ￿rms o⁄ering homogeneous goods, the model yields tractable solutions. How-
ever, the results derived in this paper are qualitatively more general, and it allows for alternative market structures
such as: Cournot competition with ￿rms that o⁄er imperfect substitutes and Bertrand competition with product
di⁄erentiation. (Available upon request).
6can be applied in order to ￿nd this type of equilibria. In addition,Navas and Licandro(2011) shows
that the OLNE equilibria in this game collapse into the CLNE (closed loop Nash equilibria) being
the game perfect or time-consistent.
The following de￿nition applies for each ￿rm in the subvariety i of the industry j (we omit some
notation for simpli￿cation). Let al = [qlT;lz
lT]; 8 T ￿ t be the strategy of ￿rm l, where [qlT;lz
lT] are
the time-paths of output and R&D workers, and let us denote ￿l; as the set of possible strategies
of ￿rm l in variety i in sector j. Let Vl be the value of ￿rm l when the ￿rm plays the strategy path




De￿nition 1 At time t, Al = [a￿
l ;a￿
￿l] is an open loop Nash equilibrium if,





￿l] ; 8 a0
l 6= a￿
l; 2 ￿l; 8l:
This condition implies that the optimal time path of strategies a￿
l maximises the value of ￿rm l
taking as given other ￿rms￿strategies, (a￿
￿l); and that the value of the ￿rm must be non-negative.
2.1 Solving for the autarkic equilibrium
Let Ei
jt denote the expenditure dedicated to consuming the variety j of the good i; and let Et
denote the expenditure that is devoted to consumption: Consumers solve the standard optimal
control problem that is de￿ned above. The optimal conditions are as follows
Ex
t = ￿Et; (3)
E
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; is the standard aggregate price index.5


































_ zlijt = Tjt(lz
lijt)￿zlijt; 0 < ￿ < 1
zlij0 > 0;
where Rs;t = e￿
R t
s r￿d￿ is the usual market discount factor. We restrict the analysis to symmetric
equilibria by assuming that the initial stock of knowledge is equal for all ￿rms in the same sector i.e.
zlij0 = zij0;8 l. In addition, to ensure simplicity, we assume that the initial productivity is equal
across all ￿rms in the economy. Because we focus on symmetric equilibria we omit the subscript l



















where vijt is the costate associated with variable zj and ￿j ￿
nj￿1+￿j
nj is the inverse of the markup
rate. We denote lj as L
nj:
The left hand side of condition (12) is the marginal gain of accumulating one additional unit of
knowledge, and it can be separated into two parts: the ￿rst consists of the reduction in the marginal
production costs, which are proportional to the quantity supplied, and the second one represents
learning by doing in research. The bene￿t of a cost-reduction innovation depends on the quantity
produced, as it determines the amount of resources that are saved as a result of such a reduction
in production costs.
Given that the quantity that is produced determines innovation e⁄ort, the way in which quan-
tities are determined is fundamental for innovation. This is shown in equation (10). In this model,
an increase in the number of ￿rms generates two di⁄erent, opposite e⁄ects. First, the market share
of each ￿rm declines, as shown in the last term of condition (10), as lj = L
njN. This is the size e⁄ect
or the market share e⁄ect. Second, the markup 1
￿j depends positively on the perceived elasticity
of demand which is positively associated to the number of ￿rms and the elasticity of substitution
across varieties.6 An increase in competition, given by an increase in the number of ￿rms or an
increase in the degree of substitutability across products, increases the perceived elasticity of de-
mand. The increase in the perceived elasticity of demand give incentives to ￿rms to increase the
quantity supplied. This e⁄ect is represented by the ￿rst term on the right hand side of (10). This
is the competition e⁄ect.
6To see this notice that the mark-up ￿j is given by: ￿j = 1
1￿~ "j where ~ "j is the inverse of the perceived elasticity
of demand ~ "j = sj"j where sj is the market share of the ￿rm and "j the inverse of the elasticity of demand (1￿￿j):
An increase in n or an increase in ￿j increases the perceived elasticity of demand.
8The set of optimal strategies across varieties depends on their own stock of knowledge and
industry characteristics. Because we have assumed that zij = z0 8 i; we will also have symmetric
equilibria across all varieties within the same industry.
To complete the model, we must impose the market clearing conditions for all markets. In the













t = L: (13)
Each ￿nal good market must satisfy that:
Lcijt = xijt
The ￿nancial market-clearing condition implies that the aggregate asset demand LAt is equal













2.2 Balanced growth path












t ; are constant and qjt;xjt;zjt;vjt and pjt grow at a constant rate. Next we will show that a
BGP exists and is unique.7







Because, xijt = njqjt, and Ex
ijt = Ex







In a symmetric equilibrium Lpjtcjt = njpjtqjt: Combining this with (17) we have that
























The per ￿rm labor demand that is dedicated to production activities is larger in sectors char-
acterised by less competition. However the industry labor demand that is dedicated to production
activities (i.e. Lx
jt = njlx
jt ) is larger for more competitive industries. As is standard under Cournot,
￿rms in sectors that are associated with lower competition produce higher quantities, but the the
total production of the sector is lower. 8 This implies that the per ￿rm labor demand in the
production sector is larger in those sectors that are less competitive.
Combining (2), (10), (11) and (12), under _ lz
jt = 0, we obtain the following equation
￿Tjt(lz
j)￿￿1lx







This is the consequence of the fact that consumers are indi⁄erent among the di⁄erent R&D
investment opportunities in each sector. In steady state the arbitrage condition implies that the
















Condition (19) reveals the dual nature of our model as a result of a standard mechanism in
oligopoly models. If we measure competition by measuring the elasticity of substitution across
products, then we ￿nd that as markets become more competitive (products become more substi-
tutable), each ￿rm produces more and therefore innovates more. However, if we measure compe-
tition by measuring the number of competitors, as markets become more competitive, each ￿rm
produces less and therefore innovates less. According to this measure, lower degrees of product mar-
ket competition are associated with greater per-￿rm resources devoted to R&D. The total industry




















nj ￿ 1 + ￿j











In this context, and for lower values of nj; a larger number of ￿rms within an industry is
associated with a larger volume of resources devoted to R&D in that industry. 9










An increase in the number of ￿rms in sector j increases the allocation of labor to production activities in sector j:
Then the aggregate allocation of labor to production activities depend on the degree of competition adjusted by size
(that we will later call ~ ￿j):
9More precisely, taking the logs of the right hand side expression and di⁄erentiating with respect to nj we ogtain:
10To obtain an expression for the equilibrium allocation of workers across activities and sectors,










A nice property of this model is that the steady state solution can be summarised in a single
non-linear equation, as follows:
 


























k = lk (20)
where ~ ￿ is a size-weighted average of the degree of competition across sectors (i.e.
N X
j=1
. ~ ￿j where
~ ￿j = ￿j￿j is a measure of the degree of competition of sector j, weighted by the importance that
sector j has in total expenditure in the manufacturing sector. For the spetial situation in which we
have two type of industries this measure becomes ~ ￿ = ￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿2:
The next proposition shows that the BGP exists and it is unique.
Proposition 2 A BGP exists and it is unique
Proof. Since f(:) is monotonically increasing, and satis￿es the limit conditions limx!0 f(x) = 0 and
limx!l f(x) > lk, existence and uniqueness is directly implied by the intermediate value theorem.
Notice that if ￿ = 1
2;￿j = ￿k and ￿j = ￿k (i.e. nj = nk; ￿j = ￿k) the previous equation is
equal to that derived inNavas and Licandro(2011) with N being the number of industries existing
in the composite sector.
To explore the properties of the model, we observe ￿gure (1) , which depicts the left and right
hand sides of condition (20) for certain parameter values (discussed below).
The LHS part of (20) is monotonically increasing and concave in the argument lz
k: However, as
we will discuss below, the value of ￿ and ￿ suggested by the data are close to zero. Substituting
these parameter values we obtain that LHS is nearly linear in this argument.
Notice that an increase in the degree of product market competition induced by an increase
in ￿k increases the per ￿rm resources dedicated to innovation in industry k: This is clearly shown
in ￿gure 2. The increase in ￿k causes an increase in ￿k and moves the LHS to the right (the














This is bigger than zero i⁄:
1
￿j > 1 + ￿
Since ￿ is going to be very close to zero, this is going to be the case of a great part of all numerical exercises. In




11quantity supplied in the market. The increase in ￿rm-size translates into greater innovation e⁄orts
and stimulate plant and industry productivity growth.
However, an increase in the degree of product market competition (measured as an increase
in nk) decreases the per ￿rm resources dedicated to innovation in industy k: The main di⁄erence
with respect to the experiment above is that when we increase nk the direct e⁄ect appears, and
moves the RHS down (￿gure 3). As is standard in the Cournot model, the direct e⁄ect is dominant;
therefore an increase in the number of ￿rms translates into a decrease in output per ￿rm. As ￿rm
size decreases, ￿rm level innovation e⁄orts decreases. Note that we can not directly o⁄er conclusions
regarding the ￿nal e⁄ect in lz
j based on 19 :
An increase in the degree of product market competition (measured as an increase in ￿j) de-
creases the ￿rm resources that are dedicated to innovation in industry k (Figure 4). The increase
in ￿j causes an increase in ￿j moving left hand side into the left. This reduces innovation e⁄orts
in industry k: As industries compete for labor, the increase in e¢ ciency in industry j is associated
with a reallocation of resources from the remainder of industries to industry j. Interestingly, this





As ￿j approaches to zero, this e⁄ect will be negligible. However, the numerical results in the section
below show that even for very low values of ￿j this e⁄ect is still quantitatively important.
Technological opportunities measured by the R&D￿ s "TFP" (Tjt) also plays an interesting role
in determining ￿rms￿innovation e⁄orts in sector j: The increase in R&D productivity in sector j
increases innovation e⁄orts but is detrimental to other sectors.
Therefore, in autarky, the increase in product market competition produces an ambigous e⁄ect
on innovation e⁄orts and industry productivity growth. This ambiguity results from the di⁄erent
ways in which the degree of competition is measured. We will see in the next section that this
ambiguity disappears in a global competitive environment. Moreover, asymmetries across industries
generate a reallocation of resources that ultimately a⁄ects the industry both statically, through a
change in the relative price of the goods and dynamically favoring industry productivity growth in
some industries to the detriment of other industries. The size of the sectors also contributes to the
relative importance of these e⁄ects.
2.3 Free trade
Consider that the economy is open to trade with M identical economies. To serve a foreign market,
￿rms pay a transportation cost of the iceberg type (i.e ￿rms need to ship (1+￿j) units of the good
to get one unit potentially sold abroad). Let denote with qlijt the quantity that ￿rm l producing
subvariety i in sector j produces in its local market and q￿m
lijt denote the quantity that each ￿rm l
in in sector j supplies to country m: Since we assume that all countries are identical, we will again

















































_ zlijt = Tjt(lz
lijt)￿zlijt; 0 < ￿ < 1
zlij0 > 0;
where q￿m
lijt is now the quantity that a local ￿rm sends to the foreign market m. We can focus
on a symmetric Nash equilibrium where qlijt and q￿m
lijt are equal for all ￿rms within the same sector
in all countries but di⁄er across sectors and across destinations (i.e, .qlijt = qj ,.q￿m
lijt = q￿
j 8 l ￿ n
,8i ;8 m ￿ M ,and qj 6= q￿































j (1 + ￿j) (24)
1 = ￿vtTjt(lz

















+ rt; j = 1;2 (26)
Firms consider the total volume of production when selecting the amount of resources to devote
to R&D. Dividing (23) and (24) we obtain the following equation:
(nj ￿ 1 ￿ ￿j)qj + Mnjq￿
j





we simplify the equation as follows:
q￿
j =
(1 + ￿j)(1 ￿ ￿j) ￿ ￿jnj
1 ￿ ￿j + Mnj￿j
qj (27)




j = 0: Unlike the monopolistic competition model where the CES preference structure ensures
13that all ￿rms have positive trade ￿ ows independently of the trade cost, trade exists in this economy
if and only if trade costs are not excessively high. This is the consequence of the fact that foreign
goods and home goods are perfect substitutes. Therefore, a su¢ cient and necessary condition
for foreign ￿rms to survive in a local market is that the cost disadvantage that is introduced by
transportation costs is not su¢ ciently large. 10 Substituting in 23, then we have that:
qj =













We simplify the equation as follows:
qj =
((1 + M)nj ￿ 1 + ￿j))(1 ￿ ￿j + M￿jnj)
nj(1 ￿ ￿j)(1 + M(1 + ￿j))
2 zjljEx
t
and substituting in 27
q￿
j =
((1 + M)nj ￿ 1 + ￿j)((1 + ￿j)(1 ￿ ￿j) ￿ ￿jnj))
nj(1 ￿ ￿j)(1 + M(1 + ￿j))2 zjljEx
t










((1 + M)nj ￿ 1 + ￿j)
￿
(1 ￿ M + 2M(1 + ￿j))(1 ￿ ￿j) + ￿2
j(1 ￿ ￿j ￿ nj)
￿
nj(1 ￿ ￿j)(1 + M(1 + ￿j))2 (28)
￿
0
j di⁄ers slightly from that de￿ned in autarky because it is generally not the inverse of the
mark-up but can still be used as a measure of competition.11 It can be shown (see the appendix)
that the steady state solution of the model can be summed up into the following equation:
 

































k = lk (29)
10In this model, foreign ￿rms serve the domestic market despite this disadvantage in costs. This feature is unique
under Cournot competition and appears to be paradoxical, as foreign ￿rms are more ine¢ cient than domestic ￿rms
when serving a local market. However, foreign ￿rms have a particular advantage over potential local entrants because
they are incumbents. This could be because there are institutional or technological barriers that limit entry.









j is the inverse of the mark-up in two extreme cases:
Autarky: (￿j =
1￿￿j
nj￿1+￿j ) or M = 0 ) and free trade (i.e. ￿j = 0): In the ￿rst case, q￿
j = 0 : thus the second element








nj￿1+￿j or M = 0: In the second
















j: This condition is analogous to the one in autarky but with
the new value for the parameter ￿
0
j:
In the appendix we show that ￿
0
j > ￿j:Navas and Licandro(2011) also reveals that a movement
from autarky to free trade, or a trade liberalization (understood as a decrease in transportation
costs) increases employment in the R&D sector, and this increased employment has positive e⁄ects
on innovation and productivity growth in a situation with perfect symmetry across sectors. The
focus of this paper is to demonstrate how the situation changes when we allow for sectorial di⁄erences
(in this context, di⁄erences in competition levels) or when we have a proccess of trade liberalization
that is not symmetric across sectors. We rely on numerical methods to demonstrate these results.
3 Results I: From Autarky to Free trade
The aim of this section is to assess the importance of di⁄erences in exposure to foreign trade or in
the the degree of product market competition on the e⁄ect of trade openness on innovation. It is
not a pure calibration exercise as the experiment does not attempt to replicate a trade liberalization
episode for a particular case. Rather we obtain plausible values for the structural parameters of the
model and then employ several counterfactuals, to better understand how these dimensions a⁄ect
the industrial response to foreign trade.
The structural parameters that we must ￿x in this section are ￿;￿;L;￿; and Tjt. In steady state
￿; the consumer￿ s discount factor, is equal to the real interest rate (logarithmic intertemporal pref-
erences). We use the value that the business cycle literature traditionally assigns to this parameter,
which is 0.03. The parameter ￿ measures the weight of the di⁄erentiated sector in total expendi-
tures. We exclude the production of services in our analysis because of the spetial characteristics of
this sector.12 We consider the manufacturing sector to be the di⁄erentiated sector of the economy.
The World Development Indicators database from the World Bank computes the value added of
the manufacturing sector as a percentage of GDP. Manufacturing represents 25% of the total GDP
for the US economy which implies a share of 91% of the total GDP net services. This justi￿es a
value for the parameter ￿ of 0:91:
It remains to ￿x the parameters ￿, L and Tjt: ￿ measures the degree of decreasing labor re-
turns in the R&D sector. To obtain reasonable values for this parameter, we rely on the work of
Ngai and Samaniego (2010) who explore the main determinants of di⁄erences in long run industry
productivity growth rates. These authors use a richer but similar innovation function. In their
paper, new knowledge is entirely produced using an intermediate research input. The elasticity of
new knowledge to this intermediate research input is equal to 0.13. This research intemediate good
12The Service sector accounted for 72% of the US GDP in 2011. However, most of the products that are included
in this sector are non-tradable by nature. When examining the standard index of trade openness
(Exports+Imports)
GDP
at the sectorial level we ￿nd that trade in services is responsible for just 8% of the value of the production of the
sector. Conversely, trade in merchandise (manufacturing+agricultural goods) accounts for 73% of the value of the
production of manufacture and agricultural goods in the US. Because we have not included a non-tradable sector in
our economy it seems reasonable to exclude the service sector from the numerical analysis.
15is produced with physical capital and labor using a Cobb-Douglas technology. The Intermediate
input￿ s labor share is 0.6. The elasticity of R&D to research labor is therefore ￿ = 0:6￿0:13 = 0:078:
We will use the value ￿ = 0:08 and perform robustness checks for this parameter.
Because the aim of the paper is to distinguish the contributions of di⁄erences in the degree of
trade openness and in the level of competition on the relationship between trade and innovation,
this study leaves apart di⁄erences in other relevant dimensions, such as technological opportunities











With ￿ very closed to zero the third term can be ignored, and this technological constant can
be proxied as follows: Tt = Lz
Lx
￿
￿: The Bureau of labor statistics reports that the average labor
force that was dedicated to industrial activities in the US for the 2000-2010 period, was 20%.
The NSF provides data on R&D employment and R&D expenditures for the US and selected
countries. For the US we ￿nd that the number of researchers steadily increased from 1, 25 million
in 2000 to 1.4 million in 2007. If we assume that the labor force in R&D activities was exclusively
employed in manufacturing, this constitutes approximately 5% of the total labour force employed
in manufacturing (that is, 1% of the total labor force aproximately) . Using these data we ￿nd that
our technological constant should take the value: Tt = 0;018:13 We will use this as a benchmark
case in addition to some sensitivity analyses.
Because the population is identical to the work force, L, in our model, we proxy for this para-
meter by using the size of the US labour force. More precisely we assign a value of 153000 which
was obtained from US labour workforce data for 2007 (provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
correctly rescaled to optimally ￿t the model). The parameters M;￿j;￿j;￿j are subject of interest
in this paper therefore, in this section they will take a di⁄erent rank of values depending on the
counterfactual exercise run in each case. The initial value for ￿j will be discussed in the next
section.
To perform the numerical exercises we assume that industries can be classi￿ed in two types,
both of which have the same expenditure shares in the consumer budget. We denote industries as
either Type I or Type II. In the ￿rst experiment both industries are equal in all dimensions and they
move from autarky to free trade, with one or more identical trade partners. Given the parameter
con￿guration, four is the maximum number of ￿rms per industry, compatible with positive pro￿ts
in equilibrium when the number of trade partners is equal to two. We restrict the analysis to two
trade partners to ensure a certain amount of variability in the number of ￿rms per industry.14
Trade openness increases R&D labour in both industries and enhances innovation and produc-
tivity growth. However, the gains in productivity decline according to the degree of competition
that both economies enjoy in autarky. This result occurs because the increase in the number of






14The maximum number of ￿rms per industry declines with the number of partners we trade. When we study the
context of three trade partners, the maximum number of ￿rms per industry is equal to three.
16when the number of ￿rms is initially low. Because all gains from trade in this model are derived from
increased competition, the model shows that the gains from trade vanish as economies approach
to perfect competition. As Epifani and Gancia (2011) document that mark-ups are systematically
higher in less developed countries, the model suggests that free trade agreements among less de-
veloped countries (southern regional trade agreements), result in a larger increase in productivity
growth than free trade agreements among developed economies. A similar result is obtained when
we measure the degree of competition using the elasticity of substitution across varieties. In this
case free trade has a larger e⁄ect on innovation and productivity growth when the degree of sub-
stitutability across products is small (i.e. consumers perceive that varieties in the same sector are
starkly di⁄erent).
Figure 5 also reveals an interesting result regarding the size of regional trade agreements. The
dotted line in the graph reports the increase in R&D employment as a result of trade openness
when the number of trade partners is two rather than one (the continous line). An increase in the
number of trade partners enhances innovation and productivity growth in all countries. However,
the increase in the R&D employment is lower when two economies open to a third partner than
when both economies eliminate bilateral trade barriers; hence, opening to a third partner generates
a smaller e⁄ect in terms of innovation and growth. The model states that an increase in the number
of trade partners within a regional trade agreement does not always produce a signi￿cantly positive
e⁄ect on innovation. As the trade block becomes larger, the degree of product market competition
increases. This increase in competition has progressively smaller incremental e⁄ects on innovation.
15 The model suggests a size "limit" for the trade block; this limit depends on the autarkic degree
of competition for each economy and is larger for initially less competitive economies. The model
also suggest that trade agreements among less developed economies are potentially more bene￿tial
than trade agreements between advanced and competitive economies.
The second set of results throughly examines the in￿ uence of asymmetric trade liberalization.
In this exercise we discuss either a movement from autarky to free trade with only one economy
or a change in the number of trade partners for just Type I industries. Type II industries remain
closed to foreign trade. The results are reported in Table 1.
Table 1 shows the percentual variation in R&D employment for Type I and Type II industries
respectively. As a consequence of trade liberalization R&D employment increases in the liberalized
sector and decreases in the non-liberalized sector. The decrease in the R&D employment in the
non-liberalized sector is a pure general equilibrium e⁄ect. Trade openness intesi￿es competition in
the liberalized sector. The increase in competition reduces mark-ups, increases production per ￿rm
and thus promotes innovation. As labour demand increases in Type I industries, labor is reallocated
to Type I industries. We can conclude that asymmetric trade liberalization positively contributes
to industry productivity growth in the liberalized sectors and negatively a⁄ects non-liberalized
sectors; therefore, it is a source of industry productivity divergence. This e⁄ect increases as the
liberalized sector becomes more open (in terms of the number of trade partners). This result occurs
because the reallocation e⁄ect increases with the improvement in e¢ ciency in the liberalized sector.
15For other parameter con￿gurations, this result is clearer, as the maximum number of trade partners is larger
than two. In this case if we consider a third regional partner, the maximum number of ￿rms that is compatible with
positive pro￿ts is three per country and we observe that adding a third trade partner produces a small increase in
innovation e⁄orts. (upon request).
17However, as a sector becomes more competitive, the e⁄ect becomes less important and becomes
negligible for certain competition levels.
The third set of results studies the in￿ uence of a movement from autarky to free trade in
industries that are characterized by di⁄erent degrees of competition. In this case we focus on trade
openness with just one trade partner. This allow us to consder six as the maximum number of
￿rms compatible with positive pro￿ts in equilibrium. To study this e⁄ect, we consider that Type I
industries remains with two ￿rms without loss of generality, whereas the number of ￿rms in Type
II industries may vary from 2 to 6. We seek to determine the change in R&D employment per ￿rm
in each sector when both sectors are open to trade.
Table 2 shows the results for Type I and Type II industries, respectively. When both type of
industries, have initially the same number of ￿rms, R&D employment increases by 5%. However, if
the initial number of ￿rms in Type II industries increases, trade openness increases R&D employ-
ment in Type I industries and reduces R&D employment in Type II industries. Again, this result is
the combination of the non-linear competition e⁄ect in Cournot and the reallocation of production
factors induced by general equilibrium e⁄ects; the increase in the perceived elasticity of demand
is larger for sectors that are less competitive in autarky. Because trade intensi￿es competition
to a greater degree in those sectors, ￿rms in those sectors increase the volume of production and
the investment in research. As the demand for production factors increases to a greater extent in
these industries, the production factors from the remainder sectors are reallocated towards those
industries.
4 Results II: Trade liberalization policies.
This section explores partial trade liberalization experiments by considering a reduction in variable
trade barriers. The structure of the section essentially follows that of the previous section: ￿rst we
examine the e⁄ects of asymmetric trade liberalization in otherwise identical industries: second we
examine a homogeneous trade policy in an heterogeneous industry environment.
To perform the numerical simulations, we must begin with an initial tari⁄ rate. Anderson and
Van Wincoop (2004) summarise tari⁄and non tari⁄barriers using TRAINS (UNCTAD) data: They
￿nd that the average tari⁄rate for industrialised countries is 5% whereas average non-tari⁄barriers
are 8%. Although there are only tari⁄ barriers in our model, we consider a tari⁄ rate of 13% which
is the sum of both. To ensure generality, we assume that both industries initially have identical
number of ￿rms and initial tari⁄. Next, we consider that Type II industries retains a tari⁄ rate of
13% whereas type I industries could have a tari⁄ rate between 0 and 13%.
Table 3 shows the variation in percentage points in per ￿rm employment in R&D activities in
both the liberalized industries (Type I) and the non-liberalized industries. Each line represents the
results for a di⁄erent initial degree of competition (number of ￿rms) which becomes larger as the
line moves to the right. The OY axis shows the variation in percentage points in R&D employment
compared with the initial situation with 13% trade costs. The OX axis shows the di⁄erent values
that trade barriers can take. The largest increase in R&D employment per ￿rm, is obtained when
18there are no trade barriers in Type I industries, and this increase varies from 0,8 (with two ￿rms in
each industry) to 2.2% (with six ￿rms). Larger tari⁄reductions are associated with larger increases
in R&D employment, although the function is concave. Trade liberalization enhances productivity
growth in those industries which liberalize, but it has a non-linear e⁄ect. The e⁄ect is stronger
when those industries are relatively more closed to foreign trade.
Another important feature of the model is that a larger initial degree of competition is associated
with a larger e⁄ect of tari⁄reductions in Type I industries. Because this result appears to contradict
previous results, we will elaborate further below.
Table 3 reveals that trade liberalization in Type I industries decreases per ￿rm R&D employment
in Type II industries. This is the consequence of the reallocation of production factors towards
the libealized industries. However, the model suggests, that these reallocative e⁄ects are not so
important in this context. This is the consequence of the fact that the average initial tari⁄ rate
for industrialized countries, is low, and therefore these countries are already open on average to
international markets. Consequently, a reduction in tari⁄s of 5 percentual points, do not change
competition enourmously in Type I industries and thus the allocation of employees across sectors.
The second experiment focuses on the e⁄ect of a homogenous trade policy in sectors that begin
with di⁄erent degrees of competition. The exercise considers a common 5% reduction in tari⁄s.
Type I industries represent the less competitive sector with an initial number of ￿rms equal to 2.
The number of ￿rms in Type II industries varies from 2 to 6. Because trade ￿ ows exist provided
that ￿￿ <
1￿￿j
ni￿1+￿j; six is the maximum number of ￿rms that is compatible with positive trade
￿ ows and positive pro￿ts for a tari⁄ rate of 13%.
Figure 6 shows the variation in percentage points of R&D employment in sector 1 while Figure
7 presents the same results for sector 2. Contrary to our previous observations, R&D employment
declines in sector 1, when the number of ￿rms in sector 2 increases. Paradoxically, the fall in
R&D employment now occurs in the less competitive industries rather than in the most competitive
industries as found in the section above. The general equilibrium e⁄ect favours the most competitive
industries rather than the less competitive industries in this scenario.
To explain this result, it is useful to plot the change in ￿ after the tari⁄reduction across di⁄erent
initial degrees of competition as shown below. Figure 8 displays the value of ￿ under two di⁄erent
tari⁄ levels, ￿ = 0:13; and ￿ = 0:08: When the initial number of ￿rms in a sector increases the
increase in teta is larger. For a homogeneous tari⁄ reduction, the increase in competition that is
associated with trade liberalization is larger in more competitive environments. The primary reason
for this result lies in the upper bound tari⁄ level ￿￿. When ￿ = ￿￿ the open economy collapses to
the autarkic one. ￿￿ is decreasing with the number of ￿rms. Thus for a given ￿; a larger number
of ￿rms indicate that the industry is closer to an autarkic situation. Therefore, two industries with
the same initial tari⁄ rate will react di⁄erently to the same tari⁄ reduction: the most competitive
industry is relatively less open to trade, and the tari⁄ reduction strongly intensi￿es competition in
this industry.
We can verify this property in Figure 8. With eight ￿rms ￿ in autarky is 0:875 and in the open
economy with no trade barriers is 0.9375. With ￿ = 0:13, the value of ￿ is 0.8851. A 5% tari⁄
19reduction leads to ￿ = 0:9167: The change in ￿ due to trade liberalization is considerable (3.57%).
However, if we consider a situation with two ￿rms, we observe that ￿ in autarky is 0.5 while in
trade with a tari⁄ of 13% is 0.7416. With no trade barriers, the value for ￿ will be 0.75. That is,
this sector which is less competitive is already very open with a tari⁄ of 13%. A 5% tari⁄ cut leads
to a ￿ = 0:7467 or an increase in ￿ of 0.68%. This small increase in competition due to a 5% tari⁄
cut is what it generates the results above.
5 Robustness
The results are qualitatively robust to changes in the parameters of interest (e.g. small changes in
the degree of decreasing returns in innovation, active population size, the discount factor). One of
the most interesting dimensions related to the robustness checks, is the manner in which the relative
sizes of the opening industries a⁄ects the response of all industries to trade liberalization. The role
of asymmetries across industries in the results may decrease as industries become less important
for the entire economy (lower ￿j). To con￿rm the relevance of this e⁄ect, we have assumed that
industries are identical in size, but the mass of industries can be classi￿ed into di⁄erent groups
where the number of groups varies from two, to forty. We conduct similar experiments in which we
vary the dimension of interest in only one type of industry. As the number of industries increase,
the relative importance of the reference type of industry decreases.
Table 4 shows the ￿rst set of results in which we consider homogeneous trade liberalization
policies with di⁄erences in the degree of competition. As previously noted, we consider that Type
I industries are less competitive, and that the remainder of industries are homogenous in terms of
competition. The ￿gure shows that when the less competitive industries are relatively smaller, the
increase in R&D employment as a consequence of trade liberalization is larger in those industries.
In contrast, when the most competitive industries are relatively larger, the decrease in R&D em-
ployment is smaller as a consequence of trade liberalization in those industries. This result occurs
because as the number of industries increases the general equilibrium e⁄ect that induced by less
competitive industries, is shared by a larger mass of industries. Consequently, the decline in R&D
employment in each, becomes progressively lower the more numerous they are. It is signi￿cant
that this general equilibrium e⁄ect vanishes relatively slowly. For example, when less competitive
industries represents 1
13 of the total output in the manufacturing sector, the decline in R&D em-
ployment in each of the rest of the remainder industries is 1%, which is not negligible. If there were
22 di⁄erent type of industries (so the less competitive industries represents 1
22 of the total output
in the manufacturing industry), then the decline in R&D employment in each of the remainder
industries will be of 0,40%. These results just show that these e⁄ects are important even if the less
competitive industries represent a very small share of the industrial output.
The same experiment was conducted by considering trade liberalization as an undercut in tari⁄s.
The very ￿rst set of results consider that Type I industries become more open while the remainder
of the industries remain at a tari⁄ rate of 13%. The results are shown in Table 5.
The results are generated with the initial number of ￿rms in each industry set to three. The
results are similar to table 5. However, the general equilibrium e⁄ect vanishes even more slowly in
20this case. When the opening industry represents 1
22 of the manufacturing output, trade liberalization
increases R&D employment in that sector by 1.8760 per cent whereas R&D employment declines
in the remainder industries by 0.20%. When the opening industry was representing 1
2 of the
manufacturing output the fall in R&D was only 0.90 per cent. As the importance of the opening
industry declines, the fall in R&D employment in the remainder of industries decreases relatively
slowly.
The same exercise has been performed for a situation with homogeneous tari⁄ reductions with
di⁄erences in the degree of competition. In this context we have decided to retain the assumption
that Type I industries are less competitive to be consistent with the other exercises. Table 6 show
the results. As we have noted above, the industries that are initially the most competitive bene￿t
the most from trade liberalization in this context. As the size of the less competitive industries
fall, the change in R&D employment is stronger in the smallest industry and is weaker in the most
competitive and numerous industries. Interestingly, the general equilibrium e⁄ect falls smoothly
with the decline in the size of the less competitive industry but remains quantitavely important
even if the size is relatively small. 16
6 Conclusions
Empirical evidence suggests that there is substantial variation in mark-ups, a proxy for the degree of
product market competition, across industries. Moreover, recent episodes of trade liberalization are
far away from being homogeneous across industries. This paper explores the e⁄ects of asymmetric
trade liberalization on innovation in an economy with heterogeneous industries in terms of the
number of competing ￿rms or the elasticity of substitution across products. All sectors use a
linear production technology and ￿rms undertake proccess innovation to increase productivity when
competing Æ la Cournot. When we open the economy we consider that the rest of the world is
identical to this economy. Therefore, heterogeneity is observed across industries but not across
countries.
To address these questions we have considered several types of trade liberalization policies (i.e.
a movement from autarky to free trade, an increase in the number of trade partners and a tari⁄
cut) and we have considered di⁄erent scenarios in which local industries were either identical or
di⁄erent in terms of competition. The advantage of these exercises is that we can isolate the e⁄ect of
asymmetric trade liberalization on industry productivity growth from the role played by industrial
heterogeneity in that process.
We ￿nd that a movement from autarky to free trade increases innovation in industries that
were initially less competitive. Conversely, a homogeneous tari⁄ reduction enhances innovation in
industries that were initially more competitive, provided that these industries begin with the same
initial tari⁄ level. This contradictory result is explained as follows: In the context of a uniform
initial tari⁄level, the most competitive industries are relatively less open to international trade. As
the tari⁄ reduction tends to foster innovation in those industries which are relatively more closed
16For example when the less competitive industries represent ( 1
38) of the total output of the manufacturing sector,
the 5 percent tari⁄ reduction still generates an increase of 0.20% in R&D employment in the remander industries.
21to foreign trade, the homogeneous tari⁄ reduction bene￿ts those industries that were initially more
competitive.
When we consider the case of perfect symmetry across sectors, we discover that an increase in the
number of trade partners increases ￿rm size, innovation and growth, for the same reason that trade
openness exert this e⁄ect: the increase in the number of trade partners intensi￿es competition from
abroad and this e⁄ect provides ￿rm with incentives to increase their production and investment in
R&D. However, this e⁄ect declines with the number of trade partners; thus this result suggests a
certain limit for trade blocks. This e⁄ect is observed because all gains from trade in this model
are derived from increases in competition. When the number of trade partners is su¢ ciently large,
economies belonging to a trade block are already close to perfect competition. The inclusion of
a new economy does not alter as much the degree of competition and therefore innovation and
productivity growth. This exercise suggests that if the model takes all relevant aspects of economic
integration, then we should consider that trade blocks should have size limits. Increasing the number
of trade partners beyond that limit, may be counterproductive for those economies if these policies
have a positive implementation cost.
This paper could be extended in several directions. The ￿rst one, which is already in progress,
considers a varying elasticity of substitution between the two ￿nal goods. This is important to
determine whether the degree of intersectorial spillovers is highly dependent on this parameter.
However as noted previously, this would oblige us to consider a model in which di⁄erences in pro-
ductivity growth across sectors are not permanent. The second direction involves the consideration
of free entry. This allow to observe in which direction the results are shaped by the e⁄ect of trade on
the extensive margin. The third direction would include ￿rm heterogeneity and investigate whether
certain characteristics of an industry, such as the degree of productivity dispersion, may enhance
or diminish the e⁄ects that of trade openness on R&D employment per ￿rm.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Derivation of 20 and 29
8.1.1 Autarky (20)














t = L: (30)
From the production function we have that
lx
ij = z￿1qij








that under the symmetric equilibrium only depends on industry and not ￿rm characteristics.













t dj = ~ ￿jLEx
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Substituting the previous expressions in (13) and dividing both sides by nk we get:
0
@






























8.1.2 Free trade (29)
For free trade we proceed as in the section above, realizing that lx













so we just need to follow previous steps, replacing ￿j by ￿
0
j and we will arive to the same
expression.
8.2 Proof that ￿
0
j ￿ ￿j
The proof consists on showing that ￿
0
j ￿￿j = 4￿ ￿ 0:
















Notice that the second element of the numerator is positive if exports are positive. The third
term is always positive so we can conclude that this expression is always positive. It would be zero
26i⁄: ￿j = ￿￿
j; M = 0: If ￿j = 0; This expresssion is reduced to ￿
0
j ￿ ￿j =
M(1￿￿j)
nj(1+M): Notice that this
expression is increasing in M which implies that larger the number of trade partners the further
the increase in competition but it is concave in M revealing that the increase in the number of
trade partners have less and less e⁄ects on competition. This expression is decreasing in nj and the
elasticity of substitution ￿j re￿ ecting that the larger the competition levels in autarky, the lower
the increase in competition coming from trade openness, and therefore the lower is the industry
productivity growth rate.
27labor R&D
steady state R&D labor in autarky
lhs
rhs
Figure 1: Steady State ￿rm-employment in R&D industry k
labor in R&D




Figure 2: An increase in ￿k:
28labor in R&D







































































































Sectorial increase in R&D Sector 2: Sector 1 opened
Table 1: Asymmetric trade liberalization











































Sectorial increase in R&D: Sector 1 number of firms varying in sector 2















































Sectorial Increase in R&D: Sector 2 number of firms varying in sector 2
Table 2: Asymmetric trade liberalization







Employment in R%D sector 1 Trade costs varying in sector 1
























Asymmetric trade liberalization sector 1.





Employment in R%D sector 1 Trade costs varying in sector 1
























Asymmetric Trade Liberalization Sector 2.
Table 3: Asymmetric trade liberalization






















































Sectorial increase in R&D increasing the number of trade partners




















































Sectorial increase in R&D increasing the number of trade partners
Table 4: Asymmetric trade liberalization












Employment in R% D sector 1 Trade costs varying in sector 1. Varying number of industries




































Employment in R% D sector 2 Trade costs varying in sector 1. Varying number of industries
























Table 5: Asymmetric trade liberalization























































Homogeneous trade policy, number of firms varying in sector 2, varying industry size















































Homogeneous trade policy, number of firms varying in sector 2, varying industry size





















































Sectorial increase in R&D increasing the number of trade partners
Figure 5: Symmetric case. Several trade partners.






















































Figure 6: Symmetric Trade liberalization. Tari⁄ reduction.















































Figure 7: Symmetric Trade Liberalization. Tari⁄ Reduction.











Degree of competition under different trade scenarios sector 2






Figure 8: PMC across di⁄erent tari⁄ levels. Varying number of ￿rms.
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